Abstract. This paper analyzes the influence of dynamic trading strategies on the prices in financial markets. After a thorough discussion of the modeling issues involved we derive the modification of the stochastic process of the underlying asset that follows from the presence of dynamic trading strategies. We analyze the nonlinear effects and the feedback from prices to trading strategy. The pricing, hedging, and replication of options in the context of illiquid markets is discussed and a nonlinear partial differential equation for an option replication strategy is derived. Finally the effects of one of the most popular trading strategies-Put-option replication-on the price of the underlying asset are illustrated using numerical simulations.
1.
Introduction. The aim of this paper is to provide a simple framework for modeling the dynamics of prices in illiquid financial markets and for analyzing the effects of dynamic trading strategies in such markets. We focus on financial markets that are influenced by dynamic trading strategies, i.e., trading strategies which prescribe the number of shares to be held in the portfolio as a function f (S, t) of the share price S and of time t. Dynamic trading strategies of this type have enjoyed increasing popularity in the past decades not least because of their central importance in option pricing theory.
In perfectly liquid markets one can find a dynamic trading strategy that reproduces the movement of the price of a given derivative asset by judiciously trading the underlying asset and cash. Finding this trading strategy is the key step in the derivation of most option pricing equations. 1 In theory, any option in a complete and perfectly liquid market can be replicated by following the appropriate trading strategy.
Since 1973 trading strategies of this type have enjoyed tremendous popularity not only in the theory but also in the practice of finance. A writer of an option can use a dynamic trading strategy to hedge his exposure, an arbitrageur can exploit mispricing in traded options by selling an overpriced option and replicating it with a dynamic trading strategy, and an investor can synthetically create the option with the payoff that suits her needs best.
The application of dynamic trading strategies has not been restricted to option pricing and hedging: Portfolio managers use dynamic trading strategies to insure themselves against movements in the share price. This strategy is called portfolio insurance and has been the subject of extensive analysis (see Leland [20] , Brennan and Schwartz [8] , and Bookstaber and Langsam [7] ).
More trading strategies have been derived in the investment analysis literature (for the continuous time case see, e.g., Merton [24] ). These portfolio investment rules give the investor's investment a strategy that maximizes his expected utility. Chartist trading strategies form another class of trading strategies that is popular in practice. The effects of these trading strategies can also be analyzed within a slight modification of the framework presented here.
Given a trading strategy f (S, t), a change in the share price by dS will mean the portfolio has to be adjusted by df , and df shares are bought in the market. But, by being trades in the share, these orders themselves may influence the price S on which they are conditioned and cause a further price movement dS . This price movement will then trigger more dynamic trading. This feedback effect is one of the main concerns of this paper. We will investigate how these trading strategies influence the stochastic process of the price of the underlying share and how the stability of the price process is affected by the presence of these trading strategies.
Usually it is assumed that the effect of individual trading on the asset price is too small to be of any importance and is neglected when the strategy is derived. This seems justified if the market in question has many participants and a high degree of liquidity, which is typically true for modern financial markets. On the other hand, the trading strategies are very often implemented on a large scale, and the liquidity of the financial markets is sometimes very limited. In the case of the October 1987 stock market crash some empirical studies (e.g., Furbush [13] ) and even the official report of the investigations carried out by the Brady commission [27] suggest that portfolio insurance trading helped to aggravate the effects of the crash. But even in noncrash environments increasing volatility has been attributed to the presence of dynamic trading strategies.
Given the evident importance of dynamic trading strategies it is surprising that their effect on the price of the underlying asset has received relatively little attention in the theoretical literature. The early work by Genotte and Leland [14] and Jarrow [17, 16] addressed the problem of market manipulation and program trading in a discrete-time framework. Genotte and Leland analyzed the effects of program trading in a rational expectations framework with special focus on the effects of differential between investors. They showed that liquidity can be very low if uninformed investors mistake program trading for informed trading. Jarrow is concerned with the existence of opportunities for market manipulation. He gave conditions under which these manipulations are not possible and went on to price a Call option in a two-period binomial model. Because they are restricted to discrete time these papers cannot capture the dynamic effects we would like to model in this paper.
In continuous time, Bick [3, 4] showed how the canonical security price process of the Black-Scholes model, the lognormal Brownian motion, can be derived in a general equilibrium model with price-taking agents. This model is a general equilibrium model with complete markets and continuous trading by all agents. Thus any new derivative security is obsolete, and therefore it will be neither traded nor hedged or replicated; the agents have no need to implement the option replication strategies we want to study here. In general for equilibrium models with complete markets, derivative security pricing is reduced to finding consistent prices, prices that are consistent with the already achieved equilibrium.
In contrast to this full general equilibrium approach in complete markets we believe that-although some traders (usually large financial institutions) have continuous trading opportunities-many investors cannot trade continuously. To these investors the markets are incomplete and a new option opens new investment opportunities to them. This new option is issued by a financial institution (with continuous trading opportunities) and sold to the investors who cannot trade continuously. The financial institution then hedges its risk by replicating the issued options with a continuous trading strategy. In this situation the introduction of a new security does create a significant amount of replication trading. In our study we want to investigate the effects of this replication trading.
Besides general equilibrium theory, market microstructure theory is another area of economic theory that is relevant for the dynamic modeling of markets. Market microstructure is concerned with the analysis of the mechanisms by which prices are set in markets. Special attention is paid to the strategic interaction of traders in the markets that results from a particular price forming mechanism and to the way in which private information is incorporated in the prices. As the collapse of option trading in illiquid markets results from the large trader's strategic exploitation of his market power, market microstructure theory can be of great use here. A good introduction to the theory can be found in O'Hara [26] . Unfortunately almost all models are set in discrete time with the exception of Back [1, 2] , who transferred the strategic trading model by Kyle [19] into continuous time.
In parallel research to this paper Frey and Stremme [12] and Frey [10, 11] developed a continuous-time model similar to the one presented in this paper. Frey and Stremme [12] analyzed the relative hedging performance of super-replication strategies and naive Black-Scholes trading in this environment. Frey [10, 11] then derived a partial differential equation for perfect replication trading strategies and option pricing in feedback markets, giving existence and uniqueness results. Frey's focused on the option pricing in illiquid markets, while this paper's main concern are the price dynamics in the underlying share: feedback effects and the possible discontinuities (crashes) in the share price. In a later work and using a similar framework, Sircar and Papanicolaou [30] focused on the numerical solution of the feedback option pricing equations and discuss the differences to the "classical" option pricing. We will argue later on why there may be fundamental difficulties with options in illiquid markets and why option replication trading, on which all these pricing equations are based, may not be optimal. In many cases derivative security markets are not viable if the market for the underlying asset is illiquid. Nevertheless, we give the derivation of the option replication formula for illiquid markets as it was first presented in Schönbucher [28] and Schönbucher and Wilmott [29] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we set up the model we used to analyze trading strategies in illiquid markets. We focus on the new modeling aspects that are introduced by the illiquidity of the markets, especially the price forming mechanism and manipulation opportunities. We also derive the parameters of the stochastic process of the price both with and without the influence of a large trader.
In the next section we give a short overview of the classical theory of the dynamic trading strategies in liquid markets and derive the canonical example of a dynamic trading strategy that replicates the payoff of a European Put option. To show the new features introduced by illiquidity, we then analyze the difference between the paper value and the real value of a portfolio in illiquid markets and give a price manipulation strategy for the large trader in this section.
The following section looks at options in illiquid markets and manipulation strategies are pointed out that will lead to a collapse of option trading in many cases. We then look at different scenarios for payoff replication in illiquid markets and derive the partial differential equations that are satisfied by the value process of these payoff functions.
In the next section we illustrate the price effects of hedging in illiquid markets using the example of Put-option replication trading. Special emphasis is laid on the destabilizing effect of feedback trading and the possibility of jumps in the price process (i.e., crashes) that are induced by some dynamic trading strategies. The numerical solution for the probability density function is used to illustrate these effects. In the conclusion the main results of the paper are summarized.
Modeling markets with dynamic trading.

Traded securities and definitions.
There are two investment opportunities: the share 2 and the risk-free bond. The price process of the share is denoted by S t and the price process of the risk-free bond is B t . We assume that the market for the share is illiquid while the market for the bond is perfectly liquid.
In classical financial theory the stochastic processes for the share price and the bond price are directly specified, and using this specification derivative securities are priced or investment decisions are made. In contrast to this approach we will have to derive the stochastic law for the share price process later on, taking demand, supply, and dynamic trading into account. The illiquidity of the share market forces us to go one step further back in the modeling approach. We only assume that the share price process can be written as a diffusion process of the form
where dW is the increment of a standard Brownian motion and the exact form for the functions µ(S, t) and σ(S, t) will be derived later on from a more fundamental model of the share market.
The Black-Scholes [5] lognormal random walk can be represented in this framework as µ(S, t) =μS and σ(S, t) =σS, (2) whereμ andσ are constants.
As the market for bonds is usually very much more liquid than equity markets, we need not worry about price effects of our trading and can directly prescribe the following price process for the risk-free bond:
the value of the risk-free bond grows at the risk-free interest rate r, and its initial value is normalized to B 0 = 1.
Market participants and information.
There are two types of market participants in the model: a large trader and a large population of small traders, representing the rest of the market. All market participants can trade continuously without transaction costs. New information continuously arrives at the market in the form of a Brownian motion W t . In a more realistic model one would take a Markovian state vector instead of a Brownian motion; we chose the Brownian motion for simplicity.
The small traders.
We do not want to model the small traders' investment problem explicitly but rather restrict ourselves to modeling the result of it: the markets reaction to buy and sell orders, and the price dynamics in absence of the large trader. Therefore we only model the aggregate behavior of the small traders in this market. Given a share price S, a value W of the Brownian motion, and time t, the small traders want to hold (on aggregate)
shares in their portfolio. This is the aggregate demand for shares in this market. Similarly we write the supply, 4 i.e., the total number of shares available in the market, as S(S, W, t). The definitions of the equilibrium (8) and (9) will use only the excess demand X (S, W, t) in the market:
X (S, W, t) = D(S, W, t) − S(S, W, t). (5)
We make the following assumptions:
• There are no other factors affecting the decision of the small traders, all necessary stochastic influences are contained in W . Specifically, the small traders are unaware of the large trader's presence and of his trading strategy.
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• The excess demand depends only on current values of S, W , and t.
• X(S, W, t) is twice continuously differentiable in S and W and once continuously differentiable in t.
• The excess demand curve X (S, W, t) has a negative slope with respect to the share price:
for all S, W, t. This common assumption in economic theory (see, e.g., MasColell, Winston, and Green [22] ) means that, everything else being equal, the small traders would like to hold more shares in their portfolio if the shares are cheap (low price S) and fewer if the shares are expensive (high S). Several justifications can be given for this assumption: The small traders' budget constraint will mean that they simply cannot afford to buy many shares if the price is high. Second, assuming that the small investors believe in a fundamental value of the share, they will want to hold more shares if they believe them to be undervalued. Finally, only with a negative slope of the demand curve will the price be moved up by a buy order of the large trader and down by a sell order of the large trader. This effect is the common reaction of prices to large transactions in most exchanges (see, e.g., Board and Sutcliffe [6] ). With a positive slope this relationship would be inverted.
• For each W and t there is a S such that X (S, W, t) = 0. (7) This S is called the (undisturbed) equilibrium price. The interpretation of X (S, W, t) as an excess demand function serves to motivate the special form of the slope of X (S, W, t) and links the model to standard models in economic theory. This interpretation is not essential to the model: one can also regard X (S, W, t) together with the price forming mechanism (8) and (9) as a functional description of the market's reaction to trades and nothing else.
The large trader.
The large trader follows a trading strategy f (S, t), which could be any dynamic trading strategy. We assumed that this strategy does not explicitly depend on the information arrival process W (except indirectly through S). This assumption can be easily dropped but to get the feedback effects we aim to model a large trader who conditions trades mainly on the price. Again we assume sufficient differentiability in f .
The demand generated by this trading strategy is f (S, t); it is added to the small traders' demand to form the total demand. To be able to do this we must assume that the small traders are unaware of the presence of the large trader in the market; otherwise we would expect X (S, W, t) to condition on the large trader's strategy f itself. Even though we will continue to speak of the large trader, one can also think of f (S, t) as a trading strategy followed collectively by another group of small traders.
Share prices.
In the absence of the large trader, the equilibrium price is defined as the price S which solves X (S, W, t) = 0, (8) given the excess demand function (5), time t, and the information process W .
With the large trader the equilibrium condition defining the share price S becomes
where the additional demand due to the large trader's trading strategy is added to the small traders' excess demand.
In the demand/supply interpretation, S is the price at which demand equals supply. If the price S in the market were lower than S, there would be surplus demand because of the slope of the demand curve. Surplus demand represents people who want to buy but cannot. They will bid the price up, toward the equilibrium price. Similarly, the excess supply for S > S (representing people wanting to sell at S ) makes the price drop, again toward the equilibrium price S. At S there is no unsatisfied demand or supply, and because of the dynamics the market equilibrium is stable. 6 Note that this argument supposes that the excess demand function is negatively sloped; for a positive slope the equilibrium would still exist but it would be unstable. We will encounter locally positively sloped excess demand functions later on.
Disequilibrium is obviously possible but given the speed of the flow of information in these markets and the large number of professionals on the stock markets, a full equilibrium in stocks and flows in modern financial markets is a good approximation. This does not mean that these markets are static; in our model both demand and supply can change in time because of the stochastic parameter W .
Example 1 (lognormal random walk as price process). As an example, consider the following specification of the excess demand which is linear in S and exponential in W:
2 )t +σW } and dS =μSdt +σSdW, (11) S follows the lognormal random walk of (2) , and a is a parameter measuring the liquidity of the market with larger a representing higher liquidity.
Example 2 (Brownian motion as price process 
Thus any price process can be supported in the excess-demand framework.
The price mechanism in detail.
The intuition behind the definition of the equilibrium price by (8) , (9) is as follows: Both large and small traders can submit a full demand function, i.e., the number of shares they want to buy (or sell) conditional on the price at which trading will take place. The large trader, for example, submits the orders df (S, t) = f (S, t) − f (S − , t−), which gives his demand as a function of the new price S; dX (S, W, t) functions similarly for the small traders. In reality such a strategy can be approximated by mixing limit orders with different limits. This mechanism is therefore similar to the order book as it is found in many stock exchanges. The sequence of events is as follows:
-The new signal dW arrives.
-The small traders submit their orders
-Simultaneously the large trader submits an order
-The equilibrium price is determined. It is the price S at which buy orders and sell orders balance (this is a common price mechanism in many exchanges 7 ), dX (S, W, t) + df (S, t) = 0.
-At this price trading takes place.
If the market was in equilibrium before (at t− we had X (S − , W − , t−)+f (S − , t−) = 0), then it will be in equilibrium at t too: X (S, W, t)+f (S, t) = 0. Thus an equilibrium in the flow variables (dX and df ) will sustain an equilibrium in the stock variables (X and f ).
2.7.
The stochastic process of the price. Instead of solving (8) or (9) directly, one can derive the stochastic differential equation satisfied by S from these equations. The stochastic differential equation will show the dynamics of S much more clearly than the implicit definition in the equilibrium equations. We are looking for a stochastic differential equation of the form (1)
which is implicitly defined by (9):
For the cross-derivative term
∂S ∂W f in Itô's formula we needed the instantaneous covariation between the share price S and the Brownian motion W . This is dSdW = σ(S, t)dt. We can substitute (1) for dS and reach
For this equality to hold both the stochastic component (in (13) ) and the locally deterministic component (in (12) and the lines above (12)) must equal zero. From (13) follows that σ(S, t) must satisfy
, (14) otherwise the increments of the right-hand side could not be equal to zero. This and the fact that the dt-component must be zero yield
∂S ∂W X (S, W, t) . (15)
In the absence of the large trader's trading strategy f (S, t), this reduces to
In fact we have given drift µ and volatility σ of the share price in terms of both S and W , i.e.
we have given µ(S, W, t) and σ(S, W, t) instead of just µ(S, t) and σ(S, t)
as in (1) . But W is an implicit function W (S) of the share price S by (9) . Thus (14) to (17) can indeed be written in the form of (1).
For (14) to (17) to make sense we need for the derivative of the excess demand with respect to the price to not be zero:
∂ ∂S X (S, W, t) = 0. Economically this restriction means that the excess demand does react to price changes. Otherwise it would not be possible to find an equilibrium by adjusting the price and the market would be completely illiquid.
Finally, we can use (16) and (17) to regain the lognormal random walk in Example 1. There,
2 )e (μ− 1 2σ
2 )t+σW , and thus by (16) and (17) σ(S, W, t) = S 0σ e (μ− 1 2σ
2 )t+σW =σS (18) and
2 )e μ− 1 2σ
2 t+σW =μS. (19) 2.8. Manipulation and arbitrage. Limited liquidity in the markets changes some of the properties of classical arbitrage opportunities as well as opening the door to market manipulation strategies. Both have to be precluded in a consistent model.
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Market manipulation. Market manipulation in its classical sense refers to trading strategies that deliberately move the price to gain a risk-free profit. 9 In section 3.4 we discuss possible price manipulation strategies, but within the model as it is presented here they do not lead to risk-free profits (as long as there are no derivative assets). This is not necessarily always the case.
For instance, assume the prices react with a delay to trades, and that a buy is followed by a rise in the price and a sell is followed by a drop in the price. In this situation a manipulator could buy large amounts of shares at the initial price S, the price would react after this (delay!) and move up to S > S; then the manipulator would sell shares at the higher price S , after which the prices would move back down to S. This round-trip trade generated a risk-free profit for the manipulator of S − S > 0 per share. 10 The key feature that allowed this manipulation strategy is that the price adjusted with a delay to the trade. This enabled the manipulator to buy at the low price before it moved up, and to sell at the high price before it moved down. Jarrow [17] shows that to prevent manipulation strategies the price adjustment mechanism must not exhibit delays.
Another much discussed possibility of market manipulation is caused by differences in the information among the investors. An informed investor could, by strategically releasing information to uninformed investors, influence the price without having to actually trade. We exclude this possibility in our framework. Here, the only possible influence an investor can have on the price is through trading the share.
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Jarrow [16] gives a sufficient condition that precludes profitable market manipulation in a discrete-time economy: if the price mechanism does not depend on the history of the orders but only on the current positions of the traders, then there are no profitable manipulation strategies.
Market corners and short squeezes.
A special form of market manipulation is the short squeeze or market corner. Here the manipulator tries to exploit a situation in which many traders have incurred short positions in the share. In practice a short position is incurred by borrowing shares from another investor and selling them on the market. When the lender wants shares back ("calling in the shorts"), the short seller has either to find another lender or to buy back the share in the market. Under normal conditions the seller can find another lender and thus keep the short position for as long as desired, but not in a cornered market.
In a situation with large short positions in the share a manipulator can buy up the whole supply of the share and lend some of those to the short sellers; the short sellers sell these shares on the market, the manipulator buys these shares as well and ends up with a position consisting of all available shares in his or her portfolio plus claims on the shares lent to the short sellers. The manipulator has cornered the market. Next the manipulator calls in the shorts, knowing that the short sellers can buy the shares they need only from the manipulator: The manipulator holds the total supply of shares in his or her portfolio. Being in this powerful position, the manipulator can dictate the price, and the short sellers must buy. This is called a short squeeze.
Because they require very large positions in the share, market corners and short squeezes are very difficult to implement. Nevertheless, especially in the 1920s and 1930s, they have been implemented in a number of cases, and even recently there have been a number of alleged market corners.
12 Short squeezes and market corners can be excluded in the model by limiting the positions of the traders.
Arbitrage opportunities. An arbitrage opportunity arises whenever the same thing is traded at two different prices. The "same thing" can be a derivative and its replicating strategy or an index and the portfolio of shares it is composed of, or shares of one company that are traded on different exchanges simultaneously. In illiquid markets arbitrage does not mean unlimited profits (as in the fully liquid case) but the feature of "money for nothing" remains. A simple example illustrates the point: Assume the share is traded in two different exchanges at prices S and S , respectively. If these prices differ (S < S , say) this would mean an arbitrage opportunity: buy the share in the cheaper market and sell it where the price is higher, cashing in the difference. In perfectly liquid markets this would generate infinite profits as the size of the trade goes to infinity.
11 Differential information may still be present; we only exclude the possibility of influencing the price without trading. A more thorough treatment of markets with differential information can be found in O'Hara [26] .
12 See Jarrow [16, p. 311 ] for examples and references.
If the markets involved are illiquid, taking the arbitrage would move the prices together and the arbitrage opportunity would disappear as it was taken. Buying in the cheaper market will push up the price in this market while selling at the higher price would lower that price. There will only be limited scope for taking the arbitrage here.
Summing up, in illiquid markets absence of arbitrage is not the only necessary condition for a market model to be consistent; we also need absence of manipulation strategies and market corners.
Dynamic trading strategies.
In the previous section we set up a market model that describes how market prices react to a trading strategy f . Now we take a closer look at the trading strategy itself, and the peculiarities introduced by illiquidity of the markets. We have to generalize the classical concepts of the value process of a trading strategy and the concept of a self-financing trading strategy to illiquid markets. Furthermore, we take a look at examples of trading strategies used in practice, with a special emphasis on option replication trading strategies.
We need these results in later sections to derive and analyze results about option replication trading strategies, but the concepts introduced hold in more general situations than the model of section 2. Therefore, we present them with more general notation. 13 We use the following notation:
• f t denotes the holdings in the share, • c t denotes the holdings in the bond, • Y t denotes the (paper) value of the portfolio, and • Y t denotes the real value of the portfolio. A dynamic trading strategy is defined by fully specifying the processes f t and c t as functions of the information available. We assume that the trading is nonanticipatory and f and c are predictable processes.
The value process. At any time t the (paper) value of the portfolio is
the sum of the value of the shares and the bonds in the portfolio, valued at the current market prices. This definition only holds if the markets are perfectly liquid. If the market for shares is illiquid, S t will not be the price at which one will be able to sell the f t shares in the portfolio, and Y t will only represent paper wealth. Therefore, we also define the liquidation value or real value Y t of the portfolio in illiquid markets. This is the value of the portfolio if the share position were to be unwound in the next instant. The real value of a portfolio is discussed in section 3.3.
Self-financing trading strategies. Self-financing trading strategies are trading strategies that do not require cash inflows or outflows after they have been set up. Buying and selling of shares is financed by selling or buying of bonds in the same portfolio.
In a quasi-discrete approximation the time sequence of events is as follows: 1. At time t− := t − dt the portfolio contains f t− shares and c t− bonds and has a value of
2. Then (between t− and t) the prices of the securities change to the new prices S t = S t− +dS t and B t = B t− +dB t . The mechanism by which the changes in price are achieved is left open in standard finance; we modeled this explicitly in the previous section.
3. This causes a change in value in the portfolio of f t− dS t on the shares and c t− dB t on the bonds held.
4. Trading also takes place, but it takes place at the new prices S t and B t , respectively. The number of shares bought is df t , costing S t df t , and the number of bonds bought is dc t , costing B t dc t .
5. After trading has taken place the new value of the portfolio is Y t = f t S t + c t B t . This can be written as
A self-financing strategy satisfies S t df t + B t dc t = 0: the cash-flow generated by selling (buying) one security exactly finances the buying (selling) of the other security. The value process is then
Furthermore, for any given share trading strategy f one can find the corresponding strategy c in the bond that makes the joint strategy self-financing.
Although the definition of the value of a portfolio will be modified in illiquid markets, the concept of a self-financing trading strategy will not change. The key property is absence of external inflow/outflow of funds, which is unaffected by the question whether S is influenced by the large trader or not. All that counts is that S is the price at which trading takes place.
Trading strategies: Some examples.
In modern financial markets many dynamic trading strategies are in use. In this section we will give some examples which will illustrate the concept of a trading strategy. As mentioned before we will mainly restrict ourselves to trading strategies that can be written as a function f (S, t) of the share price S and time t, but some more general trading strategies (e.g., some technical trading strategies) can be considered in the same framework.
Buy and hold f (S, t) = 1. This strategy involves holding one share and no trading at any time.
Limit orders. A sell order with a constant limitS can be considered as a trading strategy: The strategy is to sell one share if the share price moves above or toS. In this case the function f (S, t) has the following form: Until (and including) the time of the sale, H(S − S) is the Heaviside function with a step from 1 to 0 at S =S. This means holding on to the share until S =S. After the sale it is f (S, t) = 0: do nothing. Similarly, a buy order with limitS is f (S, t) = H(S − S) before the buy and f (S, t) = 1 after the buy.
Trading through the barrier. Here f (S, t) = H(S−S). In words: When S >S hold one share in your portfolio, when S <S have no shares in the portfolio. Whenever the share price crossesS from above, the share is sold; when it crosses from below, a share is bought.
Portfolio-optimization trading strategies. An example for these strategies can be found in Merton [24, p. 97 ff.], who analyzes the optimum investment rule for an investor with constant absolute risk aversion utility function when the security price process is lognormal. The optimum investment strategy in this case is always to hold a fixed proportion of one's wealth in the share. Combined with the resulting wealth processes, this gives an investment strategy of the form f (S, t) = c 0 e −c1t S −c2 , where c 0 , c 1 , c 2 are positive constants depending on the specification of the model. More complex rules can be derived for other specifications of the investor's preferences or investment opportunities by setting up the respective optimization problem and solving the corresponding Bellman equation. The derivation of these trading strategies is now standard in finance theory (see, e.g., Bick [4, 3] for an application and Duffie [9] for general reference).
Chartist trading strategies. Simple chartist trading strategies can be written with an extended state vector x, which includes chart indicators like moving averages or running maxima/minima, etc. The trading strategy can be described as f (S, x, t) = 1 if the chart theory gives a "buy" signal for the state x, share price S, and time t (the chartist wants to be long the share), and f (S, x, t) = −1 if the chart theory recommends selling. For instance, let x be a moving average of the share price. Then a simple chartist trading strategy would be f (S, x) = 2H(S − x) − 1; i.e., if the share price has crossed the moving average and is above it now (S ≥ x), then the chartist expects it to rise further and wants to be long in the share: f (S, x) = 1; and if the share price is below the moving average S < x, then he wants to be short in the share:
Option replication in liquid markets.
Using the definitions of the previous sections we can derive more sophisticated trading strategies that replicate the payoff of derivative securities in liquid markets. These dynamic trading and hedging strategies are now standard in option pricing theory; see, for instance, Wilmott, Howison, and Dewynne [31] or Duffie [9] .
As a canonical example we will consider the replication of a European Put option. Assume the share price follows the diffusion process given in (1):
We assume there is a self-financing trading strategy (f, c) that replicates the payoff of a European Put option, i.e., a strategy whose value process Y at expiry T coincides with the payoff of the option almost surely. To prevent arbitrage opportunities, the value process Y (S, t) = Sf (S, t) + Bc(S, t) of this trading strategy must then be equal to the market price P (S, t) of the Put option at all times before expiry, too. Otherwise a risk-free profit could be made by buying cheaper and selling the more expensive of the two equivalent investments: "option" and "trading strategy."
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Because the trading strategy is self-financing we have
dY (S, t) = f (S, t)dS + rc(S, t)B(t)dt.
Substituting from Y = fS + cB for cB yields
From the no-arbitrage condition, P (S, t) = Y (S, t) follows then with Itô's lemma:
For the increments with respect to dS to cancel we need
The number of shares to be held in the portfolio has to be equal to the partial derivative of the option value with respect to S, the so-called Delta of the option. Following this strategy the stochastic terms in the option price process and the portfolio value process cancel exactly, and the share half of the trading strategy is sufficient to hedge the stochastic component of the change in value of the option. The bond investment strategy is necessary only to make the strategy self-financing and to reproduce the nonstochastic components of the change in value of the option. Therefore, practictioners often ignore the bond half of the trading strategy and implement only the share part.
After substituting (22) for f , we reach the following condition to cancel the other integrals (with respect to dt):
This is the well-known Black-Scholes partial differential equation: The price of the Put option P (S, t) must satisfy the Black-Scholes partial differential equation, subject to the final condition that the option price must be the option payoff at expiry: P (S, T ) = (E − S) + , and appropriate boundary conditions 15 at S = 0 and S → ∞. Specifying the lognormal random walk (2) for the share price process dS =μS dt +σS dW, Black and Scholes [5] found an explicit solution to this partial differential equation, a formula for the value P (S, t) of an European Put option depending on the share price S and time t. It is
where
Here E denotes the exercise price and T the expiry date of the option, and N (x) is the cumulative normal distribution.
In their derivation Black and Scholes assumed that the share price follows a lognormal diffusion process of the form (2), absence of transaction costs, continuous trading and perfectly liquid makets.
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For the European Put equation (24) and (22) give the replication trading strategy
This is the trading strategy we are going to analyze in more detail later on. Typical plots of f are given in Figure 1 . This figure shows the delta of a European put at various times before expiry; the steeper the curve, the closer the option is to expiry.
3.3.
Real value, paper value, and the trading of large blocks. In illiquid markets there is a distinction between the paper value and the real value of a portfolio. Given a portfolio of f t shares and c t bonds at time t the paper value of the portfolio was defined in (20) as
the value of the portfolio at the current market prices. We define the real value of the portfolio f, c as the value of the c bonds plus the liquidation value of the f shares using the optimal instantaneous liquidation strategy. We will derive this liquidation strategy below:
Let the share price S t− at t− := t − dt be defined by (9):
If the large trader decides in t to liquidate his holdings in the share, i.e., places an order of df t = f t − f t− = −f t− , then the new price S t is determined by X (S t , W t , t) = 0 (26) and at this price the transaction is executed, giving a revenue of S t f t− to the large trader. But, because of the slope ∂ ∂S X (S, W, t) < 0 of the excess demand function the new price S t will be much lower than S t− , and the selling of the large trader has depressed the market price to S t < S t− . This will always happen and the real value of the portfolio must be lower than the paper value.
But by choosing a suitable liquidation strategy the large trader can minimize the loss due to the adverse price effect of his trades. Assume the shares are not sold as one block but in two halves: the first half will then be sold at S , which is defined by (27) and the second half will be sold at S t from equation (26) . Again because of the slope of X we have S t− > S > S t , and the first half of the shares was sold at a better price than S t . This procedure can be repeated to show that the best strategy for liquidation of a portfolio is to sell off the shares in a rapid sequence of small orders. Call the solution of (9) for the share priceS(f ; W t , t); i.e.,S is defined by X (S(f ; W t , t), W t , t) + f = 0 ∀f (28) and by the inverse function theorem
with an average liquidation price ofS t = 1 ft ft 0S (f ; W t , t) df , and the real value of the portfolio is
which is still less than the paper value Y t . With this specification the real value of a portfolio cannot be influenced by self-financing trades in the share: by (29) , buying another df shares addsSdf to the real value of the shares in the portfolio, but this is also the amount of money that has to be paid for these shares. This money must come from selling bonds in a self-financing portfolio, which means that the net effect of the trade on the real value is zero.
In reality the continuous selling of shares will take some time and cannot be done instantaneously, but within this model it can be done arbitrarily quickly. The path of the Brownian motion W is continuous in time and X is continuous, too. Therefore this liquidation value Y t can be approached in the limit.
Obviously this strategy can also be used to buy a large block of shares instead of selling it. A round trip (i.e., buying and then selling a block of shares at the same time) using these continuous strategies is cost free, because the real value of the portfolio is not affected.
An upper bound for the profitability of a round trip must be zero; otherwise the large trader could make infinite profits by doing round-trip trades. Therefore the liquidation strategy described above is optimal; it achieves the upper bound on profitability.
A price manipulation strategy.
If aware of the equilibrium relation (9), the large trader is able to move the price to any level desired by buying or selling the appropriate amount of shares. The large trader is even able to achieve this with vanishing cost and risk: Assume the large trader wants to move the price from S t at t to S * at T . Given the value of W T at T , the number of shares necessary to reach the target price is defined by
which is only a function f * (W ) of the value of W at time T . Using the continuous buying strategy of the previous section, the large trader will buy f * shares at T − dt at a cost of
hold these shares over T , and sell them at T + dt for
Because W is continuous, in the limit W T −dt ≈ W T , thus the large trader knows f * already at T − dt and the strategy can be executed. The profit/cost of this strategy is 1 2 , which will go to zero as the strategy is executed quickly enough. There are several possible criticisms of this manipulation strategy.
First, the quasi-continuous buying and selling of shares may not be possible in reality. The manipulator will have to pay higher prices when buying and lower prices when selling the shares, and therefore there will be some cost to the round trip. This is true to some extent; on the other hand it has been observed that in practice brokers execute large block transactions in exactly this way: they are split up into smaller pieces and then these smaller pieces are sold on the market. Furthermore, delayed publication rules for large block transactions make this execution strategy for large blocks easier and cheaper. Many exchanges use such rules.
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Second, this manipulation is easily spotted; one might therefore expect manipulations of this kind to be banned in practice. This ban would have to be imposed by an independent observer (e.g., the SEC) who observes the prices and punishes manipulators. It is true that this particular manipulation strategy is easily identified, but unfortunately there are more sophisticated trading strategies that cannot be identified from the outside.
As an example 18 consider the Brownian motion Example 2. The excess demand function is simply linear:
leading to a Brownian motion as unmanipulated price process: dS t = dW t . Now consider the trading strategy
which, when added to the excess demand, will lead to the manipulated price process
This is known as a Brownian bridge from S 0 to S * at T . It is well known 19 that a Brownian motion and a Brownian bridge are indistinguishable if the target point of the Brownian bridge is normally distributed with mean zero and variance T . In our situation a regulator will have to decide from one single sample path whether this path was a Brownian motion (normal market behavior) or a Brownian bridge to its endpoint (the market has been manipulated). This is an impossible task without knowing the target of the manipulator beforehand.
The reason for this is that the manipulator can hide his manipulation trades (which move the price by an amount of order dt) successfully behind the normal market movements (which are of order √ dt). Obviously similar manipulation strategies could be derived in other markets. This manipulation strategy will involve price exposure for a limited period of time, but again, within the model it can be performed arbitrarily quickly. Thus in our model a price manipulation in the share market can be performed by the large trader. In reality this manipulation will probably not be cost free, but manipulation remains possible (even if it is not profitable). We will see below that in the presence of derivative securities, price-manipulation strategies may become very profitable.
Option pricing.
Options in illiquid markets.
If there are derivative securities that condition on the prices in illiquid markets some new problems arise. Typically the market for the option will collapse because of the possibility of manipulation in the share price by the large trader. At expiry (as at any other time) the share price is now basically a decision variable of the large trader which can be freely manipulated and thus the trader can influence the payoff of the derivative as desired.
The cash payoff of the derivative security is denoted by P 1 (S T ) and the physical payoff by P 2 (S T ). Let us consider the example of a European Call option: A European Call option with exercise E and cash settlement would be defined by P 1 (S T ) = (S T − E) + and P 2 (S T ) = 0, while the Call with physical delivery would be defined by P 1 
(S T ) = −EH(S − E) and P 2 (S T ) = H(S − E).
(Because of the difference between real value and paper value we have to distinguish between cash and physical settlements of the option.)
Cash settlement.
Options with cash settlement are characterized by P 2 (S T ) = 0. As shown in the preceding subsection, the large trader can manipulate the share price at time T , cost-and risk-free, to any value desired. Therefore the large trader will manipulate S T to arg min
if short on the option and to arg max S T P 1 (S T ) if long on the option. 20 In the case of the Call option the manipulator would manipulate the share price into the out-ofthe-money area if short on the option and would manipulate the share price as far into the money as possible if long on the option.
There is no need for him to hedge his position because the manipulation enables him to avert any suboptimal outcome. The danger of this manipulation will prevent any nonmanipulator from trading the option and the market for the option will collapse. The only derivative security that is still viable in this environment is one with P 1 (S T ) = c a constant payoff. But this is a bond and does not really qualify as derivative security. 20 For a function g(x) and a set M the arg min is defined as the x ∈ M that minimizes g(x) (assuming it is unique):
The arg max is defined analogously.
Physical settlement.
Similarly the large trader can manipulate the payoff of Call options with physical settlement. First consider the case when the large trader has a long position in the Call option and the unmanipulated share price is below the exercise price of the option. Here it would not be sensible for the manipulator to manipulate the price into the money, because then it would be necessary to buy the share at the exercise price (which is higher than the price at which it could have been bought before the manipulation).
If the unmanipulated share price were above the exercise price a manipulator with a long position would not manipulate the share price either, because pushing the share price out of the money would destroy the real value of the option and any manipulation within the money would not change the option's payoff.
Unfortunately the large trader has an incentive to manipulate the share price if there is a short position in the option. If the option threatens to expire in the money, the large trader can manipulate the share price down and thus avoid having to deliver the share at price E.
If the unmanipulated share price were below the exercise price the manipulator could push up the share price just above the exercise price and then sell the shares already bought to push the price up to the holders of the option at the exercise price. The exercise price in this case will be above the average price the manipulator paid for the shares to push the price up.
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Generally, given the unmanipulated share price S u and the payoff functions P 1 (S) and P 2 (S), a large trader with a position of f o options will not manipulate the share price at expiry iff arg max (32) i.e., the real value Y of the physical payoff plus the cash payoff cannot be increased by manipulating the share price from S u for all unmanipulated share prices and for all positions of the large trader. The bond and the share itself satisfy this equation but most options do not.
One might argue that the small traders will recognize these manipulation strategies and therefore still exercise the option (even if the large trader has manipulated the price out of the money), because the real value of the share is more than the exercise price E. This argument has several problems.
First, why should the holders of the option exercise it (which is equivalent to buying at the exercise price E), if they could also buy at the manipulated price in the market instead? Second, the "real value" of the share that the holders of the option get by exercising can be realized only after the large trader has unwound his manipulation position. This may take some time and waiting for it will definitely involve some risk. The real value of shares in a manipulated market depends on the manipulator's strategy (unless one is prepared to sell at the manipulated prices).
Third, if the small traders are aware of the manipulation and can anticipate the large trader's behavior, other strategic considerations come to mind. They will know beforehand at which level S * the share price will end up at time T . They will try to profit from that by buying the share if its price before T is below S * and selling it if its price is above S * , with the intention of covering the position at price S * at time T . Ironically this will relieve the large trader of the need to manipulate the market, because this trading strategy of the small traders will move the price to S * at T itself. The large trader's threat to manipulate the market suffices to encourage enough small traders to jump the bandwagon and do the work themselves.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in this model we do not allow the small traders to react to the large trader's trading strategy, as is implicitly suggested in the arguments above. This is incorporated in the fact that the small traders' excess demand X (S, W, t) is independent of the large trader's trading strategy f (S, t). Thus the model as it is presented here assumes that the small traders are either unaware of the large trader's actions or are unable to condition their actions on the large trader. In principle it is possible to build a full model of strategic interaction between large and small traders in the stock market along the lines of current market microstructure research and game theory (see, e.g., Back [1, 2] for a very promising first step in this direction). These models tend to become highly complicated even in simple two-period discrete-time frameworks. Here these questions lead away from the aim of this paper.
Consequences for option pricing.
The arguments presented above apply not only to European Call options but in principle to any derivative security whose payoff depends on the share price.
Large traders who are aware of their market power will manipulate the share price to their favor. If there is a cost to the share price manipulation, the large trader will take this cost into account when choosing a manipulation strategy, but will still manipulate (maybe to a different extent). Because of these manipulations the derivatives lose their character as risk-management instruments; their payoff becomes largely independent of the risk they are supposed to hedge.
If the small traders are aware of the presence and market power of the large trader the risk of manipulation will make them unwilling to trade derivatives any more, and the option market will collapse. Option pricing in the classical sense is no longer possible; the large trader will value the option according to optimal manipulation strategy, and the small traders will do the same. The notion of pricing by using a replicating trading strategy loses its power if the price process itself becomes subject to manipulation.
The option payoff manipulations are always possible in models that take the market's reaction function to the large trades as given. The model presented here, as well as the models by Jarrow [17, 16] , Frey and Stremme [12] , Frey [10, 11] , and Sircar and Papanicolaou [30] all suffer from the possibility of these payoff manipulations.
Several ways around this problem have been implicitly suggested in the literature. For example, Jarrow [17, 16] assumes that the price moving power of the large trader is limited to a small environment of the equilibrium price and gives bounds beyond which the large trader may not move the price. Unfortunately these bounds lack further justification, and within the bounds the large trader will still manipulate as much as possible.
Another possibility (e.g., Back [2] and Frey [11] ) is to assume perfectly liquid markets at expiry of the option, which is usually done by assuming a fixed final "true" value of the share. At this price unlimited amounts of the share can be traded without manipulation. Although it is clearly unrealistic this assumption is beneficial if information aspects of the model are to be studied because it allows us to analyze the incorporation of information into the price over time; i.e., "Given that some traders are informed and know the true value beforehand, how quickly does the price converge to its 'true' value?" (This is the case in most market microstructure models, e.g., Kyle [19] or Back [1, 2] .) For option pricing alone, though, there is no reason why at the expiry date of the option the share price should be perfectly liquid, and illiquid before. For exotic options (Asians, barriers, etc.) this approach fails completely.
Payoff replication in illiquid markets.
Despite the very "destructive" results of the previous section, there are some cases in which the "pricing by replication" paradigm is still valid in illiquid markets.
Price takers' pricing.
One is taking the point of view of a small trader to whom the markets are still liquid. Consider an illiquid market that is influenced by a large trader (or a large group of small traders) following a given trading strategy f , and a small trader wants to know how to price an option given the large trader's modification of the price process. For some reason the large trader is not able to hold the option or to manipulate the payoff, either because the option is only traded over the counter (OTC) or because the large trader is really a large group of small traders who happen to follow the same trading strategy but who cannot coordinate for strategic market manipulation.
The smallness of the small trader means that he or she can basically trade any amount of shares on his or her scale without influencing the price, that the price process from (14) and (15) can be taken as given, and that the paper value and real value of the portfolio coincide. Thus the argument of section 3.2 can be repeated, whence we will arrive at the following modification of the pricing partial differential equation (23):
where the volatility is defined by (14) as
Final and boundary conditions apply in the usual way. This case is a simple generalization of the classical Black-Scholes argument. See the appendix for an asymptotic analysis of this case in the framework of Example 1.
Paper value replication.
The other case is the case when the large trader is aware of the market's illiquidity but abstains from manipulation and wants to find a self-financing trading strategy that replicates a given payoff function. This may be the case when the large trader has some exogenous exposure to hedge (without a counterparty that can be defrauded by manipulation). Now the trading strategy f is not given but has to be found as part of the problem.
Assume the paper value payoff at time T that is to be replicated is given by F (S), and that there exists a self-financing trading strategy f, c whose final paper value is F (S). We assume that this trading strategy f (S, t), c(S, t) and its paper value process Y (S, t) can be written as functions of S and t. Furthermore, the price process S is continuous and given by (15) and (14) .
Then the argument used to derive the option pricing trading strategy in section 3.2 carries through as before. Again we reach (33), this time for Y (S, t), the initial paper value of the self-financing trading strategy:
Now we have to substitute for σ(S, t) from (14) 
By solving (35) with final condition Y (S, T ) = F (S), one can find the trading strategy to replicate the paper value payoff F (S). The nonlinearity in (35) is introduced by the feedback effects between the share price process and the trading strategy.
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This partial differential equation was proposed for option valuation by the authors in [28] and [29] ; equivalent equations have been derived and analyzed by Frey [10, 11] (existence and uniqueness) and Sircar and Papanicolaou [30] (numerical solution). An asymptotic analysis of this equation can be found in Appendix B2. Again it should be pointed out that Y (S, t) above does not represent the value of the option paying off F (S) at T . There is the possibility of manipulation as explained in the previous section, and the value function and the payoff are given in paper value and not in real value.
The influence of hedging.
We now analyze in detail the effects that can arise when dynamic trading strategies are used in illiquid markets using the example of Put-replication trading in the market setup of Example 1. There are many small hedgers that all replicate a European Put option in an illiquid market with linear price reaction to the trades. The small traders are unaware of the illiquidity of the market and we group the small trader's strategies to one "large trader." Using this example we can show several points. First, we demonstrate again how to derive a modified price process; second, we see that the volatility of the price process is increased; and finally, in this example the nature of the price process is changed dramatically (by the introduction of discontinuities or jumps in the price process).
If there were no feedback effects, the share price process would be a lognormal random walk,
where S denotes the undisturbed price process:
The partial derivatives of X are
2 )S , and
Under the influence of the program trader this price process is modified according to (14) and (15) 
22 Equation (35) may seem to be three-dimensional, but by the equilibrium relation (9) W can be expressed in terms of S and f = European Put (and Call) options are (after Futures contracts) the most popular derivative securities by far. The net effect of the increasing popularity of the basic Put and Call options is an increase in hedging of short Put and Call positions or, equivalently, of replication trading of long positions in Puts and Calls in the fundamental market. As argued in the introduction, this is due to the fact that the buyers of these options are typically not able to implement a dynamic trading strategy that would replicate these options; being end-users of these risk management instruments they use the options to insure themselves against fundamental risks they previously left unhedged. The issuers of these options, on the other hand, are usually financial institutions that want to hedge against the risk from writing the option. They are able to implement the respective hedging trading strategy and do so.
Therefore, even though there is the short position of the issuer to offset the long position of the investor, the investor will not implement a replication trading strategy because he or she is already hedged, but the issuer will implement a trading strategy to hedge the short position: the issuer does not have any fundamental risk that is offset by the short position.
The trading strategy for Call option replication is equivalent to the trading strategy for Put-option replication: It is f C (S, t) = N (d 1 ) for the Call as opposed to f P (S, t) = N (d 1 ) − 1 for the Put. Therefore analyzing Put replication is sufficient to capture this motivation of replication trading.
The European Put-option replication trading strategy is often used by fund managers as Portfolio Insurance trading strategy. 23 Following such a trading strategy offers better protection against downward movements in the share price than a stoploss order, as the exposure is dynamically adjusted. McMillan [23] ranks portfolio insurance trading among the three most important automatized trading strategies. (The other two are index arbitrage and the execution of large block transactions.)
Finally, as shown above, replication strategies are closely connected to option pricing issues. From analyzing the effect of this strategy in illiquid markets it is a small step to analyzing the option pricing in these markets.
Scalings and parameters.
To analyze the behavior of the modified price process (37) and (38) we make the variables and equations dimensionless.
We let
Here S 0 is a typical value of the share price, a constant; T is a time scale, the time to maturity of an option or the time horizon of a portfolio insurer; and the dimensionless quantity ψ is a small number and denotes the size of the portfolio relative to the scale of the excess demand N . The asterisk denotes a dimensionless variable. No further scalings will be necessary and so we henceforth drop the asterisks. Thus we reach the dimensionless form of the modified equilibrium condition
where the (dimensionless) parameter α is
The liquidity of a market can be defined according to the value of α:
A liquid market is a market in which α is large. An illiquid market is a market in which α is small.
In the undisturbed equilibrium with appropriate choice of scalings α is also equal to the price elasticity of demand which is defined as (S/D)(∂D/∂S). Large α means in this context that a small relative change in the price causes a large relative change in demand. α −1 is the demand elasticity of the price. Genotte and Leland [14] found that α can vary enormously between markets; they found values ranging from 0.05 to 14 depending on the informational structure of the market. Now define
the product of the size of the portfolio (as a fraction of the total demand) and the demand elasticity of the price. The dimensionless parameter will play a central role in the further analysis. It measures the size of the influence of the trading strategy f on the market and is typically small. Thus (39) becomes
With these scalings the modified price process ( (14) and (15)) becomes dS = µdt + σdW with µ and σ given by
and
Again, (41) and (42) reduce to the lognormal random walk for = 0, confirming the choice of scalings.
The influence of hedging.
A typical form of the f of the trading strategy replicating a European Put is displayed in Figure 1 . This figure shows the delta of a European Put option at t = 1.0, 0.5, 0.1, and 0.01 before expiry. As the expiry date of the option is approached f goes towards a step function with step from −1 to 0 at the exercise price. This corresponds to the payoff diagram of a European Put whose derivative is exactly this step function.
Recalling (40) the equilibrium condition can be written as
The effect of the trading strategy is a small (i.e., of order ) perturbation added to the original demand function. Far from expiry the right-hand side of (43) is simply −S since f is small. Close to expiry the f term becomes important and the shape of the demand curve alters dramatically, becoming as shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 shows the right-hand side of (43) for the Put-replicating strategy (with = 1 to magnify the effects). As expiry approaches, the demand curve's slope becomes less and less negative in an interval around the exercise price until it is positively sloped for times very close to expiry. This signifies unstable equilibria there.
Examination of the drift µ and variance σ of the modified price process (41) and (42) yields the same result: both have a term of the form
in the denominator. This is the negative of the derivative of the total excess demand function X + f . When this derivative becomes equal to zero the excess demand function has zero slope. If the demand curve has zero slope it is locally impossible to find a market clearing price with small adjustments of the price; the price adjustments have to be of a larger order of magnitude. But this point is also where µ and σ approach infinity. But even when Geometrically, (43) can be interpreted as follows: For a given t, the market equilibria are defined as the points where the randomly moving horizontal line −S intersects the function −S + f .
As long as −S + f has no local minimum or maximum the equilibrium is unique for any value of S . But because f approaches a step function as expiry is approached, −S + f must become multivalued at some point. From this point on the time axis there are three possible equilibria of which two are stable and the one between them is unstable.
Let us now consider further what happens in these situations ( Figure 3 ). The horizontal line denotes the left-hand side in the equilibrium condition (43) and the curve is the corresponding right-hand side for t close to expiry T . There are four possible situations depending on the value of S at that point in time.
1. Here S is outside the critical region where there are several equilibria. The equilibrium E 1 is unique.
2. In this case there are three feasible equilibria: E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 . E 1 and E 3 correspond to a negatively sloped demand function, they are stable. E 2 corresponds to a positive slope in the demand function. As argued previously, this is an unstable equilibrium.
3. This is the limiting case between cases 1 and 2. There are exactly two equilibria, E 1 and E 2 . E 1 is a classical stable equilibrium while E 2 is stable only if the next step of I on its random walk is down (dS < 0). Should dS > 0 be the case then E 2 will not exist any more and the only attainable equilibrium is just above E 1 . The market will move very quickly down to that new equilibrium: a jump downward occurs and there is a discontinuity in the price. We will have to apply jump boundary conditions on the stochastic process here.
4. The fourth case is the equivalent to case 3 but with opposite signs. If dS < 0, then E 1 disappears and the market will jump up to E 2 . Again we need jump boundary conditions for the price process.
Thus there are four different points of interest: the two extrema from which the jumps come and the two points to which the price jumps (see Figure 4) . Jumps 25 can occur from point B to point D and from point C to point A. These points are defined as follows: S = B(t) and S = C(t) are the local extrema of the demand function, B is the local minimum, and C is the local maximum. The definitions of these points are
. 25 Deterministic jumps are not allowed in classical models of assets since they lead to arbitrage opportunities. As mentioned before, the small traders are assumed to be unaware of the presence and the effects of the large trader, and therefore they cannot exploit this arbitrage. 
S = A(t) and S = D(t) are defined as
The positions of these points change in time. A typical graph for a Put-replicating trading strategy is shown in Figure 5 . For any continuous time-dependent trading strategy all four boundary points have to arise at the same point. This point is characterized as a saddle point of the full excess demand function X + f , which obviously satisfies the conditions (44) to (47). In Figure 5 this point is marked as I. Subsequently the points will constantly maintain the order A < B < C < D and fan out as shown.
The Put-replicating strategy shown in Figure 1 approaches a step function as expiry approaches. B and C disappear together at the exercise price and expiry date. Points A and D approach E − and E + , respectively, resulting in a curve looking like a tulip lying on its side. Note that all the boundary curves are confined to an area of order ( × 2 ) around (E, T ).
The forward equation.
The appropriate instrument to analyze the new stochastic process (41) and (42) is the probability density function (PDF) p(S, t). The PDF gives the probability density of the share price being at S at time t subject to an initial distribution. It can be viewed as the result of a large number of MonteCarlo simulations of sample paths of the stochastic process, where roughly speaking the height p(S, t) of the PDF at a given point (S, t) denotes the proportion of sample paths that had share price S at time t. The PDF satisfies the Kolmogorov forward equation
Here L denotes the forward equation operator as defined. Frequently used initial conditions are either a delta function if the starting point of the stochastic process is known with certainty, or constant if all starting points are equally likely.
The boundary conditions for the PDF on the points ABCD are derived in the appendix; here we just observe two facts:
Points B and C act locally as absorbing boundaries. As soon as the price process hits either B or C the price jumps to the (distant) points D and A, but once it has jumped away it cannot jump back. The jumps can only go in one direction. Thus B and C act locally as "sinks," and probability mass drains away through them.
Conversely, there is a "source" of probability mass at points A and D. The price process cannot only reach A and D via normal diffusion but also by jumping from C and B.
The precise strength of these effects is derived in Appendix A.
Numerical results.
In this section we present numerical results for the solution of the forward equation in three cases. In all cases we chose the parameters as follows (unless otherwise stated): E = 10, r = 0.1, µ B = 0.2, σ 2 B = 0.2, and = 1. ( was chosen large to illustrate the effects.)
The first example is the evolution of the probability density function in the absence of any feedback. Thus = 0. In Figure 6 we show a three-dimensional plot of the PDF against asset price and time. The starting condition is a delta function at S = 10. As time increases the curve flattens out as a lognormal density function. In Figure 7 we show a contour map of this same function. The first nontrivial case is a time-invariant trading strategy that is strong enough to give rise to the four new boundaries A, B, C, and D. This may perhaps model the effect of a large number of investors hedging options with the same strike but each with a different expiry date, such that the overall effect of these hedgers is to add a time-independent function to the demand. Thus, as an example of this, we have chosen f to be the delta of an option that will expire after a certain fixed time interval. This is the simplest case to consider since the coefficients in the forward equation are time independent.
The time-independent addition to the demand, f , was taken to be that from a Put-replicating trading strategy with time fixed at t = T − 0.05, shortly before expiry. The initial price is assumed to be known: S = 11; thus the PDF contains a delta-function at S = 11. This case helps to visualize the effects of the boundaries.
The second case is simple Put replication with only one investor moving the market. The trading strategy is the replication strategy for a European Put option. This is one of the most popular trading strategies used by portfolio managers and of direct relevance for option pricing. The addition to the demand due to this one large investor is now time dependent.
A finite-difference theta-scheme (θ = 1 2 ) was used for the numerical calculations. In the time-dependent cases the time step was automatically adjusted around the boundaries A, B, C, and D.
7.1. Time-independent trading strategy. Time-invariant hedging schemes are used to maintain the general performance of the portfolio without the need to satisfy any precise conditions at fixed points in time (such as the potential liabilities from writing an option). Here we will use the delta of a European Put at time 0.05 before expiry. Figure 8 shows the full development of the PDF as time proceeds. At t = 0 the PDF is a delta function at S = 11, meaning that the price at t = 0 is known to be 11. Later the PDF spreads out. Figure 9 shows the contour plot for the PDF. These figures clearly show the "corridor" between asset values of 9.6 and 10.3 (approximately) which the asset price can never reach. This region is that between the two points previously labelled B and C. Since the replication strategy is time independent this corridor does not change shape. Even though the starting value for the asset (S = 11) is above this region the asset can still reach values less than 9.6 by reaching the barrier C and jumping across to the point A. For more realistic values of this corridor is very narrow and, away from the corridor, is effectively only a small perturbation to the usual lognormal PDF as shown in Figures 6 and 7. 7.2. Put-replication trading. The more interesting case is the time-dependent Put-replicating trading and the development in the area around the "tulip curve."
The PDF is shown in Figure 10 ; the corresponding contour plots are shown in Figure 11 .
Since this replication strategy is genuinely time dependent the corridor that we saw in the above example is now the tulip shape shown in Figure 5 .
The asset price starts off at S = 10 and then evolves. The effect of the replication strategy is felt immediately but the tulip curve itself does not appear until about t = 0.03. At this time the barren region appears around the exercise price (10) , which the asset price avoids. This zone is shown most clearly in the contour plot of Figure 11 .
After expiry of the replicated option, t = 0.04, the barren zone disappears and all values of S are attainable. 
Conclusions.
The influence of trading strategies and modern portfolio management has been the subject of much discussion but, apart from empirical studies, little theoretical research. In this paper we presented a way to formally incorporate trading strategies into the stochastic process followed by the underlying asset.
Many trading strategies that are used today are derived from replicating strategies for derivative securities. This class of trading strategies is also central to the theory of option pricing. We analyzed the difficulties encountered if one tries to build an option pricing theory in illiquid markets and argued that in many cases the possibility of market manipulation will make option trading impossible. On the other hand it will frequently still be possible to find a trading strategy that replicates a given payoff. We gave the partial differential equations that have to be solved to find these trading strategies for the scenarios of replication by a small trader in the presence of a large trader, and replication of a paper value payoff by a large trader.
In the second part of the paper we analyzed the effects of feedback trading in a special case, option replication. These trading strategies are very popular in practice both among option traders and among portfolio managers. We found that the securities whose replication destabilizes the market can be described by their payoff profile and its gamma.
The effects are especially strong in markets with low liquidity and can even induce discontinuities in the price process. Such price discontinuities are not allowed in classical models of asset prices since they lead to arbitrage. Our model does allow such arbitrage and we justify this in several ways. First, our model is deliberately nonclassical, being a first attempt to put a real-world phenomenon into a theoretical framework. Second, such effects as we describe do occur in practice and traders with a knowledge of the positions of other market players and their hedging requirements can take advantage of this knowledge. Third, it may be possible to remove certain arbitrage opportunities by incorporating elasticity in the response of the market price to large trades. The arbitrage only occurred because we did not let the small traders react fully rationally to the large trader's trading, otherwise taking the arbitrage the small traders would have eliminated it. Modeling this requires a full strategic interaction model between large and small traders, a complication we sought to avoid in this paper. The latter point will be the subject of future work.
The numerical calculation of some examples showed the typical influences that trading strategies can have on the price process.
Appendix A. Local analysis of the jump boundaries.
To analyze the local behavior of the price process and the PDF at the jump boundaries we will proceed in the following steps:
First we show in a trinominal discretization of the model the behavior of the stochastic process at a jump boundary. To apply these results to our case we then analyze the leading-order behavior of the diffusion coefficients and of the PDF at the jump boundary. Combining these results will yield the boundary conditions at the jump boundaries and the source conditions at the jump targets.
A.1. The trinomial approximation. Consider a general diffusion process with infinitesimal parameters µ and σ, which may be functions of S and t:
To approximate the continuous case we consider the restriction of the diffusion process of equation (49) onto a discrete mesh in the (S, t) domain with spacing δS in S and δt in t.
Starting from state (S, t) the process can either move up by δS to (S + δS, t + δt), move down by δS to (S − δS, t + δt), or stay at the same level to become (S, t + δt). These three events have probabilities α, β, and (1 − α − β), respectively.
For this representation of the diffusion to be a good approximation we need to use the right values for α and β. Remembering the definitions of the infinitesimal parameters µ and σ of the diffusion µ(S, t) = lim h 0 1 h E{S(t+h)−S(t)} and σ 2 (S, t) = lim h 0
h 2 E{(S(t + h) − S(t))
2 }, we have to require the same properties from our discrete process: Let us now analyze the behavior of the PDF at a jump boundary point. The jump boundary consists of two separate points: the point from which the jump occurs (B or C) and the point to which the jump goes (D or A). As the process immediately jumps away from B or C the probability of finding the process there is actually zero;
p(S = B, t) = 0 = p(S = C, t). (54)
Next consider the case when the process is at B − δS at time t. By the definition of the PDF finding the process here has probability p(B − δS, t). Here a jump occurs with probability α: the process moves up by δS to hit B and then it jumps to D. Thus the probability of finding the process at D at time t + δt is
p (D, t + δt) + αp(B − δS, t),
where p is the probability of finding the process at D if there were no jumps. 
